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1 Introduction
The labor markets of Germany and Spain have shown very diﬀerent patterns in the latest business cycles.
Over the period 1996-2013, the average rate of unemployment has been 15% in Spain and 8% in Germany
(see Figure 1). The short-run ﬂuctuations of unemployment around these average rates were much more
intense in Spain (for the same period the standard deviations of the quarterly series of the unemployment
rate are, respectively, 5.5% in Spain and 1.7% in Germany). Moreover, there is a lack of business cycle
synchronization among the two labor markets: the peak of German unemployment rate was observed
around 2006 coinciding with the trough of the Spanish unemployment rate. Meanwhile, the highest rate
of unemployment in Spain came at the end of the series, in 2013, when German unemployment reported
the lowest rate of the period.1 This negative comovement may raise severe diﬃculties for the centralized
monetary policy of the European Central Bank.2 Or, put diﬀerently, the eﬀects of a single monetary
policy over diﬀerent labor market structures such as Spain and Germany may amplify their diﬀerences
in their unemployment ﬂuctuations.
Wages also showed diﬀerentiated business cycle features for the two countries (see Figure 2). Thus, the
standard deviation of the quarterly rate of nominal wage inﬂation was roughly twice larger in Germany
(0.96%) than in Spain (0.50%) from 1996 to 2013. Meanwhile, the rate of average wage inﬂation, in
annualized terms, has been higher in Spain (3.3%) than in Germany (2.1%).
Using the database compiled by Ohanian and Raﬀo (2012), with the latest update to incorporate data
from 2013, we can also look at the adjustments of the intensive margin of labor (hours per worker) across
the two countries (see Figure 3). In both countries, there is a downward trend during the sample period
1996-2013. The average number of weekly hours per worker has been lower in Germany, which reﬂected
the higher prevalence of part-time jobs but its short-run variability was higher (the standard deviation of
the quarterly rate of growth of the series was 2.8% in Germany versus 1.9% in Spain). Remarkably, the
German series shows a sharp decline in 2008-09 to account for the use of intensive margin adjustments in
response to the reduction of aggregate demand observed during the ﬁnancial crisis: the internal ﬁrm-level
ﬂexibility brought a fall in the number of hours per worker to avoid job destruction. Meanwhile, the
Spanish series of hours per worker did not show this adjustment leading to further job destruction and a
strong increase in the unemployment rate.
Another driving factor for unemployment ﬂuctuations comes from the evolution of the labor supply.
1Boeri and Jimeno (2016) extensively discuss the divergence of unemployment ﬂuctuations across Euro area countries.
2The cross correlation between the quarterly series of the German and Spanish unemployment rates, displayed in Figure
1, is -0.74.
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Looking at the series of the rate of labor force participation (Figure 4), we see a signiﬁcant upward trend
in both Spain and Germany. However, the Spanish labor force grew much more than the German one
(from 1996 to 2013 the Spanish participation rate increased from 63% to 75% and in Germany from 70%
to 77%). The rapid and large rise of the labor force in Spain can be explained by the following three
factors:
(i) the arrival of a huge number of immigrants from the rest of the world: foreign population in Spain
increased by a factor of 10 during the sample period and most of these immigrants were at their prime
working age (Arango, 2013),
(ii) the female incorporation to the labor market: the labor force participation rate for the prime
working age of women rose from 58% to 81% in Spain whereas in Germany it rose from 75% to 81%
during the sample period 1996-2013 (Dvorkin and Shell, 2015), and
(iii) the demographic eﬀects of the entry of the baby-boom generation in the labor market: the baby-
boon generation in Spain was born before the late 1970s whereas the fertility rates in Germany already
started to decline around 1967. According to data released in the Spanish Population Census 2011 by the
Instituto Nacional de Estadística, the cohort born between 1967 and 1981, aged 30-44, has 11.8 million
people. The next cohort, aged 15-29, has 7.8 million people, whereas the previous cohort, aged 45-59,
has 9.5 million people.
In sum, these three demographic shifts were also present in the German labor market but at a lower
extent. As shown later in the paper, the pressure of a continuously higher growing labor supply on the
Spanish labor market plays a major role in explaining why the Spanish rate of unemployment has been
consistently higher than the German one.
The dramatic diﬀerences observed in the labor market performance of Spain and Germany seem to
be dissociated in their goods markets. As Figure 5 shows from 1996 to 2013, the average rate of growth
of real GDP per capita was, in annualized terms, 1.5% in Germany and 1.2% in Spain. The volatility
of quarterly rate of real GDP growth per capita has been somewhat higher in Germany (the standard
deviation of the series was 0.6% for Spain and 0.9% for Germany). The comovement of quarterly growth
in Spain and Germany has been moderately high (cross correlation of the series of Figure 5 at 0.52) which
shows a moderate degree of cyclical synchronization among their respective aggregate demands that has
not been observed in the labor markets. These sharply diﬀerences in the synchronicity features further
motivates our focus on the diﬀerences between the German and the Spanish labor markets.
What are the underlying forces driving the radical diﬀerent outcomes in the labour markets of Spain
and Germany? Are these diﬀerent outcomes the result of diﬀerences in wage ﬂexibility, hours per worker
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adjustments or labor supply shifts that we have observed empirically? There might also be institutional
factors coming from the country-speciﬁc labor market reforms. Spain passed laws for major labor market
reforms in 2010 and 2012, whereas the Hartz reforms for labor market ﬂexibility in Germany were passed
between 2003 and 2005. There might have also been country-speciﬁc supply or demand shocks to explain
the diﬀerences in unemployment variability.
Looking for answers to the previous questions, we will conduct a structural analysis of the labor
market ﬂuctuations observed in Germany and Spain. Hence, a DSGE-style dynamic macroeconomic
model à la Smets and Wouters (2007) will be extended to deliver ﬂuctuations of unemployment and
hours per worker in an environment where both real and nominal frictions interact with a rich variety
of shocks. More precisely, the labor market structure generalizes that of Casares (2010) and Casares,
Moreno and Vázquez (2014) to include a distinction between employment (extensive margin) and hours
worked per worker (intensive margin). Hence, the model combines most of the nominal and real rigidities
of full-ﬂedged DSGE models — Calvo-type price stickiness, consumption habits, investment adjustment
costs, variable capital utilization, etc. —, with additional labor market frictions aﬀecting both margins of
total hours worked.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the dynamic macroeconomic
model, which is estimated and compared for Germany and Spain in Section 3. Using business-cycle model
simulations, Section 4 explores the factors explaining labor market diﬀerences. The quarter-to-quarter
variability of the rate of unemployment is examined and compared both across countries and across
sample periods in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 A DSGE model for labor market analysis
Our model combines traditional assumptions of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
methodology (Smets and Wouters, 2007) with the introduction of unemployment as the excess supply of
labor that results from nominal rigidities on wage setting (Casares, 2010). As one theoretical contribution,
we split up the total hours of labor in the two margins of variability: the extensive margin (number of
workers) and the intensive margin (number of hours per worker). The ﬁrms must face some costs of
adjusting both the number of hours per worker and their payroll employment. In addition, we allow
for the possibility of a contemporaneous interaction between the supply of workers (i.e. labor force
participation) and the rate of unemployment. Thus, we conjecture that when the unemployment rate
rises (falls), the amount of people willing to work falls (rises). This negative comovement between the
3
Figure 1: Rate of unemployment in Germany and Spain.
Figure 2: Rate of nominal wage inﬂation in Germany and Spain.
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Figure 3: Hours per worker in Germany and Spain.
Figure 4: Labor force in Germany and Spain.
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Figure 5: Rate of growth of real GDP per capita in Germany and Spain.
labor force and unemployment can be viewed as a discouragement eﬀect (i.e., when the unemployment
rate is high unemployed workers and people thinking about entering the labor market may lost conﬁdence
of ﬁnding a job and then they may decide to abandon or simply stay out of the labor force).3 Moreover,
the model setting incorporates two new sources of variability (that were not considered in Smets and
Wouters, 2007): a labor force shock for the supply of workers and an adjustment cost shock on the
demand for hours per worker at the ﬁrm.
2.1 Households and labor supply
The representative household supplies labor to all the ﬁrms that produce diﬀerentiated goods, indexed
in the unit interval. Borrowing preferences from Smets and Wouters (2007), and adapting the possibility
of unemployment, the period utility function is given by the following non-separable speciﬁcation:
1
1− σc

Ct − λC
A
t−1
1−σc
exp

σc − 1
1 + σl
 1
0
((1− ut(i))L
s
t (i))
1+σl di

,
where σc, σl > 0 are the risk aversion and the inverse of Frisch elasticity, respectively; 0 < λ < 1 is
the consumption (external) habit parameter, Ct is the current consumption of bundles of goods, CAt−1
is lagged aggregate consumption of these bundles, Lst (i) is the supply of total hours at the i
th ﬁrm, and
ut(i) is the rate of unemployment at the ith ﬁrm. Thus, (1− ut(i))Lst (i) is the transformation of the total
3Conversely, a negative correlation between the labor force and the unemployment rate can also result from an encourage-
ment eﬀect when the unemployment rate is low because people thinking about entering the labor market may gain conﬁdence
of ﬁnding a job.
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hours of ﬁrm-level labor supply in units of eﬀective labor (i.e., ut(i) can be viewed as the probability
for a worker of being unemployed at the ﬁrm i in period t). Households maximize intertemporal utility
subject to budget constraints like this one to be held in period t 1
0
Wt(i)(1−ut(i))Lst (i)
Pt
di+
Rkt ZtKt−1
Pt
− a (Zt)Kt−1 +
Divt
Pt
= Ct + It +
Bt
exp(εbt)(1+Rt)Pt
−
Bt−1
Pt−1(1+πt)
+ Tt,
whereWt(i) is the nominal wage earned in the i
th ﬁrm, Pt is the aggregate price level, R
k
t is the rental rate
of capital, Zt is the rate of capital utilization, Kt−1 is the stock of capital accumulated by the household
in period t− 1 and rented to the ﬁrms in period t, a (Zt) is the cost of adjusting capital utilization as an
increasing convex function on the utilization rate, Divt is the aggregate nominal ﬁrm dividends, It is the
amount of investment spending on capital accumulation, Bt/ (1 +Rt) is the amount of nominal bonds
purchased in period t that yield a nominal interest rate Rt conditional to the risk-premium shock ε
b
t , and
Tt denotes government lump-sum taxes in real terms.
The ﬁrst order conditions for consumption and the supply of hours of type i that result from the
household optimizing program are

Ct − λC
A
t−1
−σc
exp

σc−1
1+σl
 1
0
((1− ut(i))L
s
t (i))
1+σl di

− Ξt = 0, (1)
(1− ut(i)) (L
s
t(i))
σl

Ct − λC
A
t−1
1−σc
exp

σc−1
1+σl
 1
0
((1− ut(i))L
s
t(i))
1+σl di

+Ξt
Wt(i)(1−ut(i))
Pt
= 0, (2)
where Ξt is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint in period t. Inserting (1) in (2) and rear-
ranging terms leads to this supply of labor to the ﬁrm i
Lst (i) =

Wt(i)/Pt
Ct − λCAt−1
	1/σl
.
Using a log-linear approximation around the balanced-growth path of the model, and taking lower-case
letters to represent the log-deviations of the variables, denoted by their upper-case letters, with respect
to their balanced-growth (steady-state) values, we obtain
lst (i) =
1
σl


wt(i)− pt −
1
(1−λ/γ) (ct − (λ/γ) ct−1)

, (3)
where γ is the balanced-growth rate and symmetric equilibrium across households holds for consumption,
ct = ct(i). Aggregating labor supply across all types yields
lst =
1
σl


wt − pt −
1
(1−λ/γ) (ct − (λ/γ) ct−1)

, (4)
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and by subtracting (4) from (3), we reach the relative labor supply equation depending positively on the
relative nominal wage
lst (i)− l
s
t =
1
σl
(wt(i)−wt) . (5)
For the distinction between the extensive and intensive margins, let us decompose the total labor supply
of type i as Lst (i) = N
s
t (i)H
s
t (i), where N
s
t (i) is the number of household members willing to work (labor
force) at the ﬁrm that produces good i, and Hst (i) is the amount of hours per worker supplied to ﬁrm i.
The labor force is assumed to be driven by the following equation
Nst (i) = N
s exp

εN
s
t − ρnu (ut − u)

, for all i,
which combines an exogenous AR(1) component, εN
s
t , and a negative response of the labor force to the
current deviation of the aggregate rate of unemployment with respect to its steady-state rate, measured by
the coeﬃcient ρnu > 0. This (encouragement/discouragement) eﬀect captures the interactions between
the labor force and the observed current unemployment. Due to perfect symmetry assumed across
households, the aggregate labor force is (in loglinear terms)
nst = ε
Ns
t − ρnu (ut − u) . (6)
Hence, introducing the log-linear decomposition of the aggregate labor supply, lst = n
s
t + h
s
t , in (4), and
also using (6), we can solve for log ﬂuctuations of aggregate hours per worker to obtain
hst =
1
σl


wt − pt −
1
(1−λ/γ) (ct − (λ/γ) ct−1)

−

εN
s
t − ρnu (ut − u)

. (7)
Finally, there are some implications of our labor market structure on the consumption function of the
households. Loglinearizing (1) and aggregating across all types of labor yields
log Ξt = −σc


1
1−λ/γ ct −
λ/γ
1−λ/γ ct−1

+ (σc−1)(1−u)
1+σlLw
(1−λ/γ)c (l
s
t − (ut − u)) , (8)
where the elements with no time subscript denote the values obtained in the detrended steady-state
solution. In addition, the loglinearized approximation of the standard ﬁrst-order condition of bonds is
log Ξt −


rt − r + ε
b
t

= Et log Ξt+1, (9)
which introduces the real interest rate as the diﬀerence between the nominal interest rate and expected
inﬂation, rt = Rt − Etπt+1. Using (8) and the corresponding expression for period t + 1 in (9) brings
a consumption function featuring consumption habits, a risk-premium shock and a response to eﬀective
labor ﬂuctuations
ct =
λ/γ
1+λ/γ ct−1+
1
1+λ/γEtct+1−
1−λ/γ
σc(1+λ/γ)


rt − r + ε
b
t

+ (σc−1)(1−u
n)1+σlNHw/c
σc(1+λ/γ)

lst −Etl
s
t+1 − (ut −Etut+1)

.
(10)
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2.2 Firms and labor demand
Labor demand extends the framework of Casares et al. (2014) to distinguish between the two labor
margins at the ﬁrm level. Thus, total labor demand of type i is Ldt (i) = H
d
t (i)N
d
t (i) where N
d
t (i) is
the demand for jobs-workers (extensive margin) and Hdt (i) is the hourly utilization rate for each worker
(intensive margin).
Firms have access to a Cobb-Douglas production technology and sell their output in a monopolistically
competitive market à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Labor adjustments are costly both in the intensive and
the extensive margins. On the one hand, there is an adjustment cost in total labor, ACt(i), measured by
the following function
ACt(i) =
eε
h
t c

Hdt (i)

Ndt (i)
,
where c

Hdt (i)

is increasing on Hdt (i) and ε
h
t is an exogenous AR(1) shock. Notice also that ACt(i)
incorporates an economies-of-scale eﬀect since the adjustment costs associated with changes in the inten-
sive margin decreases with the size of the extensive margin, Ndt (i). On the other hand, there is a ﬁxed
cost κ > 0 of keeping workers active for payroll employment Ndt (i). In short, these two types of costs
result in a trade-oﬀ between the two labor margins for the representative ﬁrm.
In turn, the representative ﬁrm will determine the decomposition of total labor demand, Ldt (i), between
the intensity of job utilization (number of hours per worker, Hdt (i)) and the payroll employment (number
of active jobs, Ndt (i)) by maximizing the following proﬁt (earnings) function
et(i) =
Pt (i)
Pt
Yt (i)−
Wt(i)
Pt

1 +
eε
h
t c

Hdt (i)

Ndt (i)
	
Ldt (i)−
Rkt
Pt
Kdt (i)− κN
d
t (i),
subject to Ldt (i) = H
d
t (i)N
d
t (i). The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to H
d
t (i) and N
d
t (i) turn out to
be, respectively,
Pt (i)
Pt
∂Yt (i)
∂Hdt (i)
−
Wt(i)
Pt
Ndt (i)−
Wt(i)
Pt


eε
h
t c′


Hdt (i)

Hdt (i) + e
εht c


Hdt (i)

= 0, (11)
Pt (i)
Pt
∂Yt (i)
∂Ndt (i)
−
Wt(i)
Pt
Hdt (i)− κ = 0. (12)
Noticing ∂Yt(i)
∂Hdt (i)
= ∂Yt(i)
∂Ndt (i)
Ndt (i)
Hdt (i)
within a Cobb-Douglas technology, we transform (11) as follows
Pt (i)
Pt
∂Yt (i)
∂Ndt (i)
Ndt (i)
Hdt (i)
−
Wt(i)
Pt
Ndt (i)−
Wt(i)
Pt


eε
h
t c′


Hdt (i)

Hdt (i) + e
εht c


Hdt (i)

= 0,
and multiplying by
Hdt (i)
Ndt (i)
, it is obtained
Pt (i)
Pt
∂Yt (i)
∂Ndt (i)
−
Wt(i)
Pt
Hdt (i)−
Wt(i)
Pt
Hdt (i)
Ndt (i)


eε
h
t c′


Hdt (i)

Hdt (i) + e
εht c


Hdt (i)

= 0.
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Finally, using (12) in the previous condition yields the following optimal demand for hours
Wt(i)
Pt
Hdt (i)
Ndt (i)


eε
h
t c′


Hdt (i)

Hdt (i) + e
εht c


Hdt (i)

= κ. (13)
In equilibrium, the decision of the ﬁrm makes the marginal cost of adjusting the intensive margin -left-
hand side of (13)- be equal to the marginal cost of adjusting the extensive margin -right-hand side of
(13)-. Taking a log-linear approximation in (13) and assuming an adjustment cost function for hours,
c

Hdt (i)

, with the same properties as the capital utilization cost function of Christiano et al. (2005)
results in the following dynamic equation for the ﬂuctuations of the demand for hours per worker4
2 +
ωH
1− ωH

hdt (i) = n
d
t (i)− (wt(i)− pt)− ε
h
t , (14)
where ωH =
c′′(H)
c′(H) is the steady-state elasticity of the marginal adjustment cost of changing hours per
worker with respect to the number of hours per worker. A higher adjustment cost elasticity reduces the
variability of hours per worker.
The wage setting procedure is determined by the log ﬂuctuations in the ﬁrm-level demand for labor
ldt (i). From standard optimizing behavior, the labor demand of ﬁrm i equalizes the ratio of marginal
products of labor and capital to the relative input prices, including the adjustment costs ACt(i),
1− α
α
Kdt (i)
Ldt (i)
=
(1 +ACt(i))Wt(i)/Pt
Rkt /Pt
, (15)
where 0 < α < 1 is the capital share in the Cobb-Douglas technology.5 The log-linearized version of (15)
is6
ldt (i) = k
d
t (i)− (wt(i)− pt) + r
k
t . (16)
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology with ﬁxed costs as in Smets and Wouters (2007), the loglinearized
production function is
yt(i) = Φy


(1− α) ldt (i) + αk
d
t (i) + ε
a
t

,
where εat is an AR(1) total factor productivity technology shock and Φy is the steady-state markup
(equivalent to 1 plus the ratio of ﬁxed costs of output in steady state). This technology implies the log
ﬂuctuations of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital demand
kdt (i) =
1
α


Φ−1y yt(i)− (1− α) l
d
t (i)− ε
a
t

.
4The steady-state properties of the hour adjustment cost function are c(H) = 0, c
′′(H)
c′(H)
= ωH and the level of hours per
worker in the steady state is normalized at H = 1.
5 It can be noticed that the real marginal cost of ﬁrm i in period t is MCt(i) =
((1+act(i))Wt(i)/Pt)
1−α(Rkt /Pt)
α
exp(εat )α
α(1−α)1−α
.
6Notice that the costs of adjusting the intensive margin do not enter in the log-linearized optimality equation due to their
steady-state properties (i.e. c(H) = 0).
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Substituting the value of kdt (i) from the last expression in the labor demand equation (16) and rearranging
terms results in
ldt (i) = Φ
−1
y yt(i)− α


(wt(i)− pt)− r
k
t

− εat . (17)
As is standard in a Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition framework, demand-determined output is
inversely related to the relative price
yt(i) = yt − θ (pt(i)− pt) , (18)
where θ > 0 deﬁnes the elasticity of demand and the relative price is pt(i) − pt. Inserting (18) in (17)
gives
ldt (i) = Φ
−1
y yt − θΦ
−1
y (pt(i)− pt)− α


(wt(i)− pt)− r
k
t

− εat ,
and taking the diﬀerence between ﬁrm-speciﬁc and aggregate values results in a relative labor demand
equation depending on both relative prices and relative wages
ldt (i)− l
d
t = −θΦ
−1
y (pt(i)− pt)− α (wt(i)−wt) , (19)
which introduces ldt as the log-deviation from steady state of demand-determined employment obtained
from the aggregation of log deviations on ﬁrm-speciﬁc labor demand: ldt =
 1
0 l
d
t (i)di.
2.3 Wage setting rigidities and unemployment
The aggregate rate of unemployment, ut, is deﬁned as 1.0 minus the ratio between the aggregate demand
for workers and the aggregate labor supply of workers
ut = 1−
Ndt
Nst
.
In semi-loglinear terms, the aggregate rate of unemployment becomes
ut − u = (1− u)


nst − n
d
t

, (20)
where un is the steady-state rate of unemployment.
Following Casares et al. (2014), nominal wages are either revised to match intertemporal labor supply
and demand, or adjusted directly through a standard indexation rule. A constant Calvo (1983) probability
determines whether the wage takes the notional equilibrium or sticks to an inertial rule. Let ξw denote
the probability that the wage cannot be revised for labor clearing. The wage setting decision belongs to
heterogenous ﬁrms, that diﬀer from each other in their history of Calvo signals for both price and wage
setting.
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In a log-linear fashion, the nominal wage at the representative i ﬁrm is set at the value that results
from the intertemporal condition:
E
ξw
t
∞
j=0
β
j
ξjw


lst+j(i)− l
d
t+j(i)

= 0, (21)
where lst+j(i) and l
d
t+j(i) represent the log deviations, in any t+j period, from their respective steady-state
levels of the labor supply of workers and the labor demand for jobs of type−i labor, Lst+j(i) and L
d
t+j(i).
In the absence of wage stickiness (ξw = 0), there would be a perfect matching between ﬂuctuations of
ﬁrm-level labor supply and labor demand, lst (i) = l
d
t (i). We have derived two expressions above that
respectively determine the log ﬂuctuations of type−i labor supply, (5), and type−i labor demand, (19),
depending upon relative wages and prices. They can be plugged, for any t + j period in condition (21)
to reach
E
ξw
t
∞
j=0
β
j
ξjw

1
σl
(wt+j(i)−wt+j) + l
s
t+j + θΦ
−1
y (pt+j(i)− pt+j) + α (wt+j(i)−wt+j)− l
d
t+j

= 0.
(22)
The fraction of wages that cannot be set to match intertemporal labor supply and demand are automat-
ically raised by applying an indexation rule that combines a weight 0 < ιw < 1 for lagged inﬂation, πt−1,
and the complementary weight 1−ιw for the steady-state inﬂation rate plus a stochastic wage-push shock
εwt , which is generated by an ARMA(1,1) exogenous process. If ﬁrm i cannot revise the labor contract
in period t+ j, it will apply the following nominal wage adjustment7
Wt+j(i) =Wt−j−1(i)

(1 + πt+j−1)
ιw(1 + π + εwt+j)
1−ιw

. (23)
Using a log-linear approximation to (23), and assuming that the i ﬁrm can set the labor-clearing wage in
period t, we can solve (22) for the relative nominal wage to obtain8
wt(i)−wt = −
(1−βξw)
(σ−1l +α)(1+Λ)
Et
∞
j=0
β
j
ξjw


lst+j − l
d
t+j

+Et
∞
j=1
β
j
ξjw

πwt+j − ιwπt+j−1 − (1− ιw) ε
w
t+j

,
(24)
where Λ is a coeﬃcient that results from a non-linear combination of structural parameters. Meanwhile,
the wage indexation rule (23) implies a proportional relationship between the relative wage, wt(i)− wt,
and the rate of wage inﬂation, πwt , adjusted by the indexation factors
wt(i)−wt =
ξw
1−ξw
[(πwt − π
w)− ιw (πt−1 − π)− (1− ιw) ε
w
t ] . (25)
7The wage indexation rule is very similar to the one assumed in Smets and Wouters (2007), with the only diﬀerence that
we include a cost-push shock εwt to replace the wage markup shock of their model.
8See Casares et al. (2014) for the derivation. Further details are in a technical appendix available upon request.
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Combining (24) and (25) results in the wage inﬂation equation
πwt −π
w = βEt

πwt+1 − π
w

+ιw (πt−1 − π)−βιw (πt − π)−φw


lst − l
d
t

+(1−ιw)

εwt − βEtε
w
t+1

, (26)
where the slope coeﬃcient φw =
(1−βξw)(1−ξw)
ξw(σ
−1
l +α)(1+Λ)
is analytically determined by most of the deep parameters
of the model.
2.4 Summary of the new
From the household optimizing program, the aggregate supply of total hours, in loglinear terms, is
hst + n
s
t =
1
σl

wt − pt −
1
(1−λ/γ) (ct − (λ/γ) ct−1)

,
where the labor force is governed by the following equation
nst = ε
Ns
t − ρnu (ut − u) .
Regarding ﬁrm’s program, both margins of labor are introduced in the Cobb-Douglas production function
to obtain the aggregate and log-linear expression
yt = Φy

αkst + (1− α)


hdt + n
d
t

+ εat

,
whereas the aggregate demand for hours per worker constrained by the adjustment rigidities is
2 +
ωH
1− ωH

hdt = n
d
t − (wt − pt)− ε
h
t ,
that incorporates the shock on the adjustment costs of the intensive margin of labor, εht , as an additional
source of variability from the labor market. The variables that determine the demand for hours per
worker are the the level of employment (with a positive eﬀect to allow complementarity), the real wage
(with a negative eﬀect) and the exogenous component of the hours adjustment cost function (with a
negative eﬀect).
The rate of unemployment only refers to the extensive margin of labor (employment)
ut − u
n = (1− un)


nst − n
d
t

,
and wage inﬂation depends (inversely) on the gap between total hours supplied and total hours demanded
πwt − π
w = βEt

πwt+1 − π
w

+ ιw (πt−1 − π)− βιw (πt − π)
− φw


(hst + n
s
t)−


hdt + n
d
t

+ (1− ιw)

εwt − βEtε
w
t+1

.
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In line with a similar wage-inﬂation equation derived in Galí (2011), the last equation recalls the original
Phillips (1958) empirical curve in the inverse relation linking wage inﬂation with the rate of unemploy-
ment.9 Finally, the deﬁnition of the aggregate real wage brings the following expression linking the real
wage to nominal wage inﬂation
wt − pt = (wt−1 − pt−1) + (π
w
t − π
w)− (πt − π) .
This seven-equation system determines solution paths for hst , n
s
t , h
d
t , n
d
t , π
w
t − π
w, wt − pt and ut − u,
given values for demand-determined output, consumption, and the rate of inﬂation.
As in Smets and Wouters (2007), the overall resource constraint provides demand-determined out-
put ﬂuctuations with the additional variability coming exogenously from an aggregate demand shock
cross-correlated to the technology shock. Also borrowing the structural dynamic equations of Smets and
Wouters (2007), the combination of the optimal capital utilization rate -subject to adjustment costs- and
the stock of capital optimally decided by the household -subject to adjustment costs on changes of invest-
ment and an AR(1) investment-speciﬁc shock- determines both the ﬂuctuations of capital accumulation
and investment spending. The consumption function (10) includes a labor eﬀect, as already discussed
above.
The rate of price inﬂation depends on the ﬂuctuations of the real marginal costs with hybrid backward-
looking and forward-looking dynamics
πt − π =
ιp
1+βιp
(πt−1 − π) +
β
1+βιp
Et (πt+1 − π) +
(1−βξp)(1−ξp)
(1+βιp)ξpΦ
mct + ε
p
t ,
where Φ depends, among others, on the Calvo probability of wage stickiness to reﬂect the connections
between price setting and wage setting at the (decentralized) ﬁrm level, and there is also a price markup
ARMA(1,1) shock, εpt , that brings exogenous inﬂation variability.
10
The model is completed with a monetary policy rule à la Taylor (1993), featuring interest rate
smoothing and a response to the change in the output gap as in Smets and Wouters (2007)
Rt −R = ρ (Rt−1 −R) + (1− ρ) [rπ (πt − π) + ryyt] + r△y [yt − yt−1] + εRt , (27)
where 0 < ρ < 1, rπ > 1.0, ry, r△y > 0, ε
R
t is an AR(1) monetary policy shock and the output gap, yt, is
deﬁned as the diﬀerence between log ﬂuctuations of current output and log ﬂuctuations of natural-rate
9Galí (2011) incorporates unemployment in a DSGE model by extending the sticky-wage model of Erceg et al. (2000) to
have household members with speciﬁc labor disutility. Furthermore, the aggregate labor supply is computed at the average
real wage that may be diﬀerent from the aggregate labor demand given by the state of technology and the aggregate demand
conditions. By contrast, our model delivers unemployment ﬂuctuations from ﬁrm-level mismatches between labor supply
and labor demand due to ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage stickiness.
10See Casares et al. (2014) for the details.
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potential output, the latter deﬁned as the amount produced if the economy were in a scenario free of
nominal rigidities (i.e. Calvo probabilities on both price and wage setting equal to zero, ξp = ξw = 0).
The set of dynamic equations and the list of endogenous variables of the model can be reviewed in
the technical appendix.
3 Estimation
This section is divided in two subsections. The ﬁrst subsection describes the data used in the estimation
and the Bayesian econometric approach used to estimate the DSGE model for each country. The second
subsection discusses the diﬀerent estimation results of labor market parameters found between Germany
and Spain.
3.1 Data and estimation approach
The model is estimated with quarterly observations of a sample period that begins in the second quarter
of 1996 and ends in the fourth quarter of 2013. We take as observable variables nine quarterly time
series from both Germany and Spain. German data on the rate of inﬂation (from the GDP implicit
price deﬂator), the 3-month nominal interest rate, the unemployment rate, and the log diﬀerences of
the real GDP, real consumption, real investment, and the real wage were downloaded from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED2) database.11 All the Spanish series were also obtained from FRED2,
except for the 3-month interest rate and the unemployment rate that were retrieved from BDREMS
due to not available data over the whole sample period studied. BDREMS is a database commonly
used to estimate DSGE models of the Spanish economy as the REM model of Boscà et al. (2010).
Meanwhile, data on the log diﬀerences of hours worked per worker (intensive margin) and employment
(extensive margin) are coming from the updated database constructed by Ohanian and Raﬀo (2012).12
This database overcomes the lack of data on the intensive margin as it utilizes a consistent measure
across OECD countries, which makes it suitable for international labor market comparisons as the one
carried out in this paper. Moreover, in line with our representative household DSGE model, variables are
measured in per-capita terms when appropriate.
11The rate of inﬂation is obtained as the ﬁrst diﬀerence of (the log of) the implicit GDP deﬂator. The German 3-month rate
is an interbank rate (reference code IR3TIB01DEQ156N). The German unemployment rate is "Harmonized unemployment
Rate: All Persons for Germany" (reference code DEUURHARMQDSMEI). Finally, the nominal wage is "Hourly Earnings:
Private Sector" for the two countries. The German (Spanish) reference code is LCEAPR01DEQ661S (LCEAPR01ESQ661S).
12We thank Andrea Raﬀo for kindly sharing their updated database with us.
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The estimation approach follows a standard two-step Bayesian estimation procedure. First, a max-
imization of the log posterior function is carried out by combining prior information on the parameters
with the likelihood of the data. In general, the prior assumptions are identical for the two countries
and similar to those assumed in Smets and Wouters (2007) for US data, together with additional prior
information associated with the parameters characterizing unemployment. By imposing identical priors
for the structural parameters on technology and preferences of the two countries, we might be able to use
the information provided by the data to uncover diﬀerences between the two labor markets.
In addition, the distinction between the two labor margins brings about a few additional parameters.
Thus, the prior distribution of the hours adjustment cost parameter, ωH , follows a beta distribution with
mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.15. Similarly, the prior distributions of the parameters describing
persistence and the standard deviation of the innovation associated with each additional shock are iden-
tical to the corresponding parameters describing the other AR(1) shocks of the model. Finally, the prior
distribution of the parameter featuring the interaction between the labor force and the unemployment
rates, ρns,u, is a normal distribution with mean 0.5 and a large standard deviation of 2.0 in recognition
of our limited information about this interaction.
Preliminary estimation exercises using Spanish data set led to an estimate of the steady-state markup,
Φy, hitting its lower bound value of 1.0. This result implies that Spanish ﬁrms would be perfectly
competitive, which is inconsistent with the monopolistic competition framework characterizing our DSGE
model. As a compromise, we ﬁx Φy = 1.2 (i.e. a steady-state markup of 20%) for the two countries.13
There is an exception to this general rule of using common priors for the two countries. The prior
distribution of the steady-state unemployment rate parameter is assumed to have a higher mean in Spain
(15%) than in Germany (8%) -but an identical standard deviation of 2.0- in order to incorporate the
prior information that the average unemployment rate is roughly twice higher in Spain than in Germany.
13This value lies inside the conﬁdence band of (1.17,1.69) estimated in Smets and Wouters (2003, p. 1143) for the whole
Euro area and using a rather diﬀerent sample period (1980:2-1999:4). Moreover, by setting free Φy when estimating the
model for Germany, the estimated value is close to 1.5, but the rest of parameter estimates and thus the conclusions of the
paper remain robust.
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Table 1. Priors and estimated posteriors of selected parameters
Sample: 1996-2013 Priors Posteriors
Germany Spain
Labor market Distr Mean Std D. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
ξp : price Calvo probab ility Beta 0.50 0.10 0.84 0.78 0.91 0.81 0.75 0.87
ξw : wage Calvo probab ility Beta 0.50 0.10 0.61 0.47 0.76 0.93 0.91 0.95
ιp: p rice indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.32 0.12 0.53 0.53 0.22 0.84
ιw : wage indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.56 0.25 0.10 0.39
ωH : hour utilization. ad just. cost Beta 0.50 0.15 0.24 0.10 0.37 0.39 0.21 0.59
ρns,u: c ross corr n
s, u Normal 0.50 2.00 2.24 1.36 3.09 0.27 0.11 0.43
σl : inverse Frisch lab or supply elastic ity Normal 2.00 0.75 0.56 0.14 0.97 2.29 1.25 3.29
Monetary policy rule
ρ: inertia Beta 0.75 0.10 0.90 0.87 0.93 0.91 0.87 0.95
rπ : inﬂation Normal 1.50 0.25 1.43 1.26 1.60 1.50 1.42 1.58
ry : output gap Normal 0.12 0.05 0.23 0.16 0.30 0.09 0.01 0.16
r∆y : output growth Normal 0.12 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.04 0.11
3.2 Estimation results
Table 1 shows the posterior estimates of some selected parameters in two panels for Germany and Spain.14
The upper panel reports the estimates for parameters characterizing the labor market and nominal
rigidities whereas the bottom panel provides the estimated coeﬃcients of the monetary policy rules. In
regards to the posterior estimates that measure nominal rigidities, we observe that the sticky-price Calvo
probability, ξp, is slightly higher in Germany than in Spain (0.84 versus 0.81), but the sticky-wage Calvo
probability, ξw, is much higher in Spain than in Germany (0.93 versus 0.61). Hence, price rigidities are
quite similar and high in both countries, while wage stickiness last substantially longer in Spain (the
estimated duration of the average labor contract is 3.5 years in Spain and slightly less than 8 months in
Germany). The price indexation parameter, ιp, is estimated at a higher value in Spain (0.53 versus 0.32),
but the wage indexation parameter is somewhat higher in Germany (0.36 versus 0.25).
In addition, Table 1 reports that the parameter measuring the marginal adjustment cost of changing
hours per worker, ωH , has a mean value of the posterior estimate equal to 0.53 in Spain and to 0.32 in
14The Appendix shows the tables containing full estimation results.
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Germany. This implies a lower elasticity in demand for hours per worker of Spain relative to the German
one (see equation 14). Therefore, variations in the real wage, employment or the hours adjustment shock
will have a greater response of hours per worker in the German labor market. The curvature parameter
of labor disutility, σl, is four times higher in Spain that in Germany (2.29 versus 0.56), which brings
a much lower labor supply elasticity in Spain in response to changes in the real wage (see equation 4).
Finally, there is a signiﬁcant discrepancy in the estimated value of the cross eﬀect between the labor force
and the rate of unemployment, ρns,u, with a posterior estimate of 2.24 in Germany, substantially larger
than the Spanish estimate at 0.27. This result indicates that the German labor force is quite sensitive to
changes in the unemployment rate, whereas this interaction is much weaker in Spain, in a way consistent
with the lower labor supply elasticity estimated for Spain.
Summarizing, our estimation results point at diﬀerences in nominal wage stickiness, in the rigidities
to adjust the hours per worker and in the ﬂexibility of the labor force as the three main structural factors
explaining the diﬀerent labor market outcomes in Germany and Spain. In the comparison, Germany had
more ﬂexibility to adjust wages, hours per worker (intensive margin) and the labor supply (extensive
margin) which absorbed changes in the demand for labor with little impact left for unemployment vari-
ability. As discussed below, the shock decomposition will also provide country-speciﬁc exogenous sources
of variability with a substantial impact on unemployment ﬂuctuations.
In the estimation of the DSGE model for Germany and Spain we have not imposed any constraint
capturing the presence of a common monetary policy for these two countries belonging to the Euro area.
Remarkably, the point estimates of most policy parameters are rather similar. Moreover, the standard
conﬁdence bands largely overlap. The exception in this pattern is the coeﬃcient associated with the
output gap, ry, which is roughly twice larger in Germany than in Spain. Hence, the Taylor’s central-bank
prescription, (27), captures better the responses of the ECB to cyclical ﬂuctuations of the output gap
in Germany than in Spain. In order to check whether our estimation results are robust to ignoring the
presence of a common monetary policy we have re-estimated the model for Spain using the German
interest rate as observable instead of the Spanish interest rate.15 Estimation results (not reported here
for the sake of brevity) are basically the same indicating that both the German and the Spanish interest
rates barely react to the Spanish output gap.
15The series of short-run nominal interest rate in Germany and Spain are basically identical for the subsample period
that goes from 1999 to 2012. Before the launching of the Euro (1999) and during the sovereign debt crisis (after 2012) the
Spanish interest rate is higher than the German one.
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4 Model-based evaluation
This section discusses the diﬀerences between the labor markets in Spain and Germany using second-
moment statistics, impulse-response functions and the variance decomposition.
4.1 Business cycle statistics
Table 2 (Germany) and Table 3 (Spain) show the second-moment statistics on volatilities, cross cor-
relations and autocorrelations of the four labor market variables for both actual data (top panel) and
simulated data using the estimated DSGE model (bottom panel).16 As mentioned above, the ﬂuctuations
of the unemployment rate are roughly three times more volatile in Spain than in Germany (the standard
deviation is 5.51% in Spain and 1.66% in Germany). Similarly, the growth rates of the two labor margins
have more variability in Spain than in Germany. However, the opposite is true for the rate of nominal
wage inﬂation with a German standard deviation of 0.96%, roughly twice larger than the value reported
for Spain (0.50%).
Regarding the contemporaneous correlations, we do not observe any substantial comovement between
the rate of unemployment and the rates of growth of the two labor margins, with the exception of a
moderate negative correlation (-0.36) between the unemployment rate and the employment growth rate
in Spain. In addition, the contemporaneous correlation between the unemployment rate and the rate of
nominal wage inﬂation is -0.55 in Spain, in contrast to a much weaker correlation (-0.10) between these
two variables in Germany.
As for the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation statistics, we observe that the unemployment rates are extremely
persistent in the two countries, with the same coeﬃcient of autocorrelation at 0.99. However, there are
diﬀerences in the ﬂuctuations of the extensive and intensive margins of labor: the quarterly rate of
growth of employment is much more persistent in Spain than in Germany, with reported coeﬃcients of
autocorrelation 0.84 and 0.21, respectively; and the rate of growth of the intensive margin is not persistent
at all, with negative coeﬃcients of autocorrelation in both economies (probably, due to the strong trend
eﬀects that were displayed in Figure 3). Finally, the autocorrelation coeﬃcient of the nominal wage
inﬂation rate is 0.45 in Spain, whereas it turns negative in Germany (-0.19).
In the comparison with the statistics obtained in model simulations, Tables 2 and 3 indicate that
our extended DSGE model does a good job in replicating most of the second-moment statistics, which
makes it an appropriate tool for examining the business cycle features distinguishing the labor markets
16The logs of both employment and hours per worker seem to follow a downward trend over the sample period for the two
countries. So, we have computed the statistics for the (stationary) growth rates of these two variables (i.e., ∆n and ∆h).
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in the two countries. Thus, the model captures the higher volatility of the unemployment rate as well
as the lower volatility of wage inﬂation in Spain compared to Germany. Moreover, the estimated model
is able to replicate the null correlations between the unemployment rate and the growth rate of hours
per worker in the two countries as well as the low and negative correlations between the unemployment
rate and both the employment growth rate and the wage inﬂation rate in Germany. As for serial inertia,
the estimated model mimics the high persistence of the unemployment rate in the two countries as well
as the positive (negative) autocorrelation of the rate of nominal wage inﬂation in Spain (Germany).
There are some diﬃculties in replicating the volatility and persistence of the extensive margin of labor
because the model reports standard deviations of △n substantially higher than the ones observed in the
data (especially in Germany) and lower coeﬃcients of autocorrelation (especially in Spain). Since the
estimation is made using the unemployment rate as observable (and not employment data) the ﬁt of the
model to the data is stronger for the series of unemployment than for the series of employment.17 Finally,
the model also underestimates the negative coeﬃcient of correlation between the unemployment rate and
the wage inﬂation rate in Spain.
Table 2. German second-moment statistics (1996:2-2013:4)
u △n △h πw
Actual Data
Std. dev., % 1.66 0.34 0.79 0.96
Correlation with u 1.0 -0.03 0.03 -0.10
Autocorrelation 0.99 0.21 -0.25 -0.19
Estimated model
Std. dev., % 1.40 1.09 0.71 1.30
Correlation with u 1.0 -0.12 0.00 -0.06
Autocorrelation 0.96 0.10 -0.08 -0.06
17Another possible explanation for these diﬃculties is that the growth rates of the two margins of labor mainly capture
high-frequency (short-term) labor market ﬂuctuations whereas the model is designed to explain ﬂuctuations at business-cycle
frequencies.
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Table 3. Spanish second-moment statistics (1996:2-2013:4)
u △n △h πw
Actual data
Std. dev., % 5.51 0.83 0.92 0.50
Correlation with u 1.0 -0.36 0.08 -0.55
Autocorrelation 0.99 0.84 -0.61 0.45
Estimated model
Std. dev., % 4.23 1.29 0.88 0.62
Correlation with u 1.0 -0.13 0.04 -0.11
Autocorrelation 0.97 0.16 0.02 0.57
4.2 Impulse-response functions
Figures 6-9 show the responses of output, the rate of unemployment, hours per worker, employment,
the labor force, the rate of nominal wage inﬂation, the rate of price inﬂation and the nominal interest
rate in Germany (solid line) and in Spain (dashed line) to a technology shock, an interest rate shock, an
hours adjustment cost shock and a labor force shock, respectively.18 The size of the shocks have been
normalized to the mean value of the posterior estimated standard deviation across countries.
Figure 6 shows that the responses to a technology shock are larger and more persistent in Spain than
in Germany for the unemployment rate, employment, price inﬂation and the nominal interest rate whereas
the opposite occurs for output, wage inﬂation and the labor force. The rise of productivity reduces the
demand for labor in both margins, and the rate of unemployment increases at the time of the shock and
gradually falls down to values below the steady-state rate (faster in Germany than in Spain).
Figure 7 displays the responses to an interest rate shock, which are more pronounced and in general
more persistent in Spain than in Germany. The exceptions are the reactions of wage inﬂation and the
labor force, which respectively indicate further wage adjustment ﬂexibility and procyclical labor force in
Germany. In turn, the unemployment rate is barely aﬀected by monetary policy shocks in Germany. This
result gives support to the idea that the ECB’s monetary policy has been primarily designed to stabilize
the German business cycles. The intensive margin of labor (hours per worker) moves down as demand
falls, being the cut lower in Germany due to the severe decline of the real wage.
As expected, Figure 8 documents that a shock to the hours adjustment cost function have eﬀects in
opposite direction for the extensive and intensive margins of labor. Thus, a positive realization of this
18The impulse response functions associated with the remaining ﬁve shocks of the model are included in the Appendix.
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Figure 6: IRFs after a technology shock (one estimated std deviation).
shock makes more attractive to increase employment (labor extensive margin) and reduces hours per
worker (labor intensive margin). Somewhat similar to the previous two shocks, the initial responses of
all variables -but the labor force- are higher in Spain than in Germany. Nevertheless, the substitution
among the two labor margins is more persistent in Germany than in Spain. The job creation that results
from this shock moves the rate of unemployment down. In turn, the labor force expands due to the cross
eﬀect between labor market participation and unemployment embedded in (6). Such reaction is found
much stronger in the impulse-response function of Germany that incorporates a much higher estimate of
the cross eﬀect coeﬃcient ρns,u.
Figure 9 shows quite distinctive responses to a labor force shock in the two countries depending on the
variables analyzed. Thus, the nominal variables (price inﬂation, wage inﬂation and the nominal interest
rate) are barely aﬀected by this shock in the two countries. However, the unemployment rate and the
labor force responses are sizeable in the two countries, but more pronounced in Spain. This indicates the
relevance of labor force shocks to drive Spanish unemployment ﬂuctuations that will be further examined
in Section 5. Finally, even though the responses of output and the two margins of labor are tiny at the
time of impact of the labor force shock, the medium-term responses (8-20 quarters ahead of impact) have
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Figure 7: IRFs after an interest-rate shock (one estimated std deviation).
diﬀerent signs in the two countries showing a sharp diﬀerence in the transmission mechanism of this shock
across countries.
4.3 Variance decomposition
Table 4 brings the long-run variance decomposition (inﬁnite forecast horizon) for ﬂuctuations of output,
the unemployment rate, the rates of growth of hours per worker and employment, and the rate of nominal
wage inﬂation in the estimated models for Germany (top panel) and Spain (bottom panel). Output
variability is mostly driven by technology shocks in Germany (58%) and by a combination of demand-
side shocks on the interest rate and risk premia in Spain (both ηb and ηR together account for 68.6%
of output ﬂuctuations). We can also observe in Table 4 that the ﬂuctuations in the unemployment rate
in the two countries are mostly explained by either the labor force shock or the hours adjustment cost
shock. The former is much more important in Spain (44% labor force shock and 23% hours adjustment
cost shock), whereas in Germany the two of them have a rather similar share around 35%. Meanwhile,
risk-premium and interest rate shocks together also explain a sizeable share of unemployment ﬂuctuations
in Spain (25.7%) and in Germany (14.5%).
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Figure 8: IRFs after an hours adjustment cost shock (one estimated std deviation).
Figure 9: IRFs after a labor force shock (one estimated std deviation).
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The inﬂuence of either price-push or wage-push shocks is little for both output and unemployment,
especially in Germany (with percentages around 1% of the overall variability of both variables). In the
case of Spain, these shocks account jointly for nearly 8% of output variability and 3% of unemployment
variability.
Table 4. Variance decomposition, %
Germany
y u △h △n πw
Technology, ηa 58.4 4.9 12.8 14.5 5.8
Risk-premium, ηb 7.3 4.9 0.1 11.1 7.9
Interest-rate, ηR 14.5 9.6 0.1 16.6 12.8
Investment adj. cost, ηi 8.0 3.5 6.3 17.6 0.3
Fiscal/Net exports, ηg 10.7 4.9 7.1 15.5 0.0
Price-push, ηP 0.9 0.6 1.2 2.5 1.1
Wage-push, ηW 0.2 0.1 29.7 3.8 72.1
Hours adj. cost, ηh 0.0 37.9 42.8 18.4 0.0
Labor force, ηn 0.0 33.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Spain
y u △h △n πw
Technology, ηa 17.2 2.1 6.5 20.4 1.1
Risk-premium, ηb 39.8 14.7 3.8 14.7 16.3
Interest-rate, ηR 28.8 11.0 3.5 13.1 5.9
Investment adj. cost, ηi 3.6 0.9 0.7 2.4 0.3
Fiscal/Net exports, ηg 3.1 1.5 1.5 4.9 0.7
Price-push, ηP 2.2 1.7 0.4 2.9 1.9
Wage-push, ηW 5.5 1.3 1.8 1.7 73.7
Hours adj. cost, ηh 0.0 22.8 81.8 39.9 0.1
Labor force, ηn 0.0 44.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
The ﬂuctuations of the growth rate of hours per worker (intensive margin) in Germany are mostly
explained by the hours adjustment cost shocks (42.8%), the wage-push shocks (29.7%) and the technology
shocks (12.8%), whereas the hours adjustment cost shocks explain 81.8% of Spanish intensive margin.
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Demand shocks only explain around 10% of the ﬂuctuations of the growth rate of the intensive margin of
labor for the two countries. In regards to the growth rate of employment (extensive margin of labor), the
variance decomposition is qualitatively similar to the one associated with the intensive margin of labor
with three important diﬀerences. First, the hours adjustment cost shock accounts for less employment
variability (18.4% in Germany and 39.9% in Spain). Second, the inﬂuence of technology shocks is much
larger in Spain. Finally, the eﬀects of demand-side shocks and interest rate shocks on employment
variability are substantial in the two countries. Adding up the shares of ηb, ηR, ηi and ηg gives percentages
of employment growth variability explained by demand-side shocks of 60.8% in Germany and 35.4% in
Spain. Investment and ﬁscal-net exports shocks are more important for Germany than for Spain.
Regarding wage inﬂation ﬂuctuations, there is an important similarity between the two countries:
wage-push shocks explain a substantial share of wage inﬂation ﬂuctuations (more than 70%). Another
important share (around 20% in the two countries) of these ﬂuctuations are explained by risk premium
and interest rate shocks together.
5 The sources of variability for the rate of unemployment
Figures 10 (Spain) and 11 (Germany) show the quarter-to-quarter shock decomposition of the rate of
unemployment, respectively, together with the plot of the actual deviation of the series from its estimated
steady-state value (15.13%). Table 5A provides the average quarterly contribution of the shocks of the
model to the variability of the unemployment rate in Spain, whereas Table 5B does it for Germany.
Looking at Figure 10, we observe two well-marked subperiods. In the quarters that go from 1996 to
2007 there was a downward trend of the rate of unemployment; those were years of economic expansion
and a housing bubble in Spain. The short-run variability of the Spanish unemployment rate came from
the combination of three main driving shocks. The labor force shock pushed up unemployment by the
exogenous increase in the labor supply. As discussed in the Introduction, the immigration ﬂows, the
demographic pattern of the baby-boom and the increase in the women’s labor force participation rate
explain a continuous increase in the labor supply. In the opposite direction, both the interest-rate shock
and the hours adjustment cost shock pulled down the Spanish unemployment rate. These latter eﬀects
dominate over the former and the rate of unemployment fell to the minimum value observed just before
the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008. The column for the period 96:2-07:3 of Table 5A provides the estimated
numerical eﬀects: the monetary shocks and the hours adjustment shock reduced the Spanish rate of
unemployment in -2.9% and -2.32% per quarter, respectively, and the labor force shock had an average
impact on it estimated at an increase of 3.15% per quarter.
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Figure 10: Shock decomposition of the Spanish quarterly rate of unemployment, %.
Our interpretation of the monetary shocks is that the ECB policy boosted the aggregate demand in
Spain because the interest rates set for the Euro area were too low for the business cycle phase in Spain.
The lack of business cycle synchronization between the business cycles of the core countries (Germany,
France) and those of the peripheral countries (e.g. Spain) brought expansionary interest-rate shocks to
Spain. Furthermore, nominal wages have been quite rigid in Spain and the desirable increase in nominal
wages did not occur to cool down the economic expansion. The other contributor to the reduction in
unemployment was the hours adjustment cost shock that kicked in especially after 2002. The progressive
ﬂexibility for the hiring processes in Spain may explain this exogenous perturbation, which reduced hours
per worker, increased the number of jobs and cut the unemployment rate. The Spanish labour market
reform of 2001 changed the regulation to reduce the hiring administrative procedures and facilitated the
part-time labor contracts (Gil-Martin, 2002).
The picture changed dramatically during the Great Recession. After 2008, the Spanish unemployment
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Figure 11: Shock decomposition of the German quarterly rate of unemployment, %.
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rate rose dramatically to reach in 2013 a peak value more than 10% higher than its estimated steady-state
value of 15.13% (i.e., the unemployment rate reached the 25% level). In the six-year period from 2008
to 2013, the labor force shocks together with risk-premium shocks -capturing the burst of the housing
bubble- gained more importance in the variability of the Spanish unemployment rate. Indeed, these two
shocks mostly explain why the Spanish unemployment rose after 2008 (see Figure 10). As informed in
the column of the 2007:4-2013:2 sample period of Table 5A, the estimated quarterly contribution of the
labor force shocks to the Spanish rate of unemployment was an increase of 9.62%, and the risk-premium
shocks pushed it up by 2.22% per quarter. The role of interest rate shocks was minor, and actually there
were contractionary monetary policy shocks which brought job destruction and had pushed the Spanish
unemployment rate a bit up over the last quarters of the sample. Finally, the hours adjustment cost
shocks gradually decreased their importance since 2008 until the end of the sample, but they still pulled
down the rate of unemployment with an average quarterly estimated reduction of -2.7%.
Figure 11 displays the quarterly decomposition of the unemployment variability in Germany. The
deviation of the series from its estimated steady-state value (7.74%) is also plotted and we can see that
the unemployment rate reached its peak by the middle of 2005 and has ever decreased afterwards with
the only exception of a few quarters at the beginning of the Great Recession in 2009. In the central
quarters of the sample period, around the maximum value of the German unemployment rate, labor
force shocks mainly determined the evolution of the unemployment rate while hours adjustment cost
shocks pushed the German unemployment rate down. Both technology shocks and risk-premium shocks
also contributed for the reduction of the German rate of unemployment before 2005 (see Table 5B). Since
2009 labor adjustment cost shocks have pushed the German unemployment rate further down, while labor
force shocks have progressively lost their importance to become almost negligible. The tension between
the rising of the labor force for the demographic reasons mentioned above (immigration ﬂows, baby boom
and the increase in female labor participation) and the exogenous fall in hours per worker turned down
in favor of the latter which reduced signiﬁcantly the rate of unemployment from the mid-2000’s onwards.
As reported in Table 5B, the hours adjustment cost shock explains an average reduction of the German
rate of unemployment by 2.05% in the sample period from 2006-2013 and this reduction is lower (1.38%)
over the full sample. These shocks are likely to capture the deep eﬀects of the labor market reforms that
Germany implemented between 2003 and 2005, commonly known as the Hartz reforms. As discussed
in Engbom et al. (2015), these labor market reforms were followed by a large and persistent decline
in unemployment. One of the main elements of the Hartz reforms is the introduction of the so-called
"Minijobs" and "Midijobs", which reduced the social security contributions, cutting the labor cost for
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the ﬁrm and rasing the net salary for the worker (Jacobi and Jochen, 2006).19
In short, the lack of synchronicity of the Spanish and German rates of unemployment during the
Great Recession can be explained by the following two factors. First, the labor force shock increased
in Spain and decreased in Germany, pushing up the rate of unemployment in Spain and lowering that
pressure in Germany due to labor supply ﬂuctuations. We interpret the labor force shock as the exogenous
variability of the labor supply coming from a variety of demographic factors, international labor mobility
and changes in female labor participation. Second, the hours adjustment shock took a great inﬂuence to
reduce the rate of unemployment in Germany, whereas in Spain its eﬀect tends to vanish over the Great
Recession period. We identify the hours adjustment shock with the exogenous ﬂexibility (regulation) to
create more jobs through the splitting up of hours per worker.
For the full sample period, 1996:2-2013:2, the labor force (demographic) shocks explains a 5.43% in-
crease of the Spanish rate of unemployment, whereas the hours adjustment shocks (labor market reforms)
and the (Euro area) monetary policy shocks account for a reduction of it by 2.02 and 2.46%. In the case
of Germany, the impact of hours adjustment cost shocks (labor market reforms) brings an estimated fall
of the unemployment rate by 1.38% which is greater than the rise due to (demographic) labor force shocks
estimated at 0.9% per quarter.
Table 5A. Sources of variability of the Spanish quarterly rate of unemployment, %
96:2-07:3 07:4-13:2 Full sample
Technology, ηa -0.08 0.56 0.14
Risk-premium, ηb 0.29 2.22 0.97
Investment adj. cost, ηi -0.03 0.11 0.02
Price-push, ηP 0.18 -0.02 0.11
Wage-push, ηW 0.15 -0.30 -0.01
Fiscal/NX, ηg 0.39 -0.71 0.01
Interest-rate, ηR -2.90 -0.40 -2.02
Hours adj. cost, ηh -2.32 -2.70 -2.46
Labor force, ηn 3.15 9.62 5.43
19A Minijob is a job generating an income below 400 euros per month. A person holding a Minijob is exempt from
social security contributions, which eﬀectively increases net wages. Jobs with incomes between 400 and 800 euros are called
Midijobs. For these jobs, social security subsidies are paid at a decreasing rate, depending on the income.
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Table 5B. Sources of variability of the German quarterly rate of unemployment, %
96:2-05:4 06:1-13:2 Full sample
Technology, ηa -0.12 0.01 -0.05
Risk-premium, ηb -0.07 0.27 0.12
Investment adj. cost, ηi 0.09 -0.08 0.00
Price-push, ηP -0.05 0.07 0.02
Wage-push, ηW 0.02 0.00 0.01
Fiscal/NX, ηg -0.02 -0.46 -0.26
Interest-rate, ηR 0.02 -0.13 -0.09
Hours adj. cost, ηh -0.49 -2.05 -1.38
Labor force, ηn 0.89 1.01 0.90
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have extended the medium-scale dynamic stochastic model described in Casares, Moreno
and Vázquez (2014) to consider the two margins of total labor variability: the extensive margin (number
of workers) and the intensive margin (number of hours per worker). The resulting model combines
traditional assumptions of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) methodology (Smets and
Wouters, 2007) with the introduction of unemployment as the excess supply of labor driven by wage
stickiness (Casares, 2010). This model has been estimated using German and Spanish quarterly data
for the sample period 1996-2013 to study the main diﬀerences between the Spanish and German labor
market ﬂuctuations. In particular, we explain why the unemployment volatility is much higher in Spain
than in Germany.
The main ﬁnding is the estimation of large and persistent shocks that raise the Spanish labor force
to make it play a prominent role in explaining the volatility of the rate of unemployment in Spain. This
result corroborates the empirical evidence on the dramatic increase of the labor force participation rate
in Spain, which increased from 63% to 75% from 1996 to 2013. A combination of demographic factors
such as the inﬂow of immigrants, the entry of the baby-boom generation in the labor market and the
rise of female participation are behind this fact. In the estimated model, the unemployment-augmenting
labor force shocks explain a 5.43% increase in the Spanish rate of unemployment. For Germany, the labor
force shocks only account for an estimated 0.90% rise of its rate of unemployment.
Other four factors that have also contributed to explain the large diﬀerences between the German and
Spanish labor markets are the following: wage rigidity has been much higher in Spain than in Germany,
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the labor force has been much more elastic to changes in either the real wage or the unemployment
rate in Germany than in Spain, there have been persistent shocks in the German hours per worker that
moved down the unemployment rate (which could be capturing the eﬀects of the Hartz reforms with
the massive use of minijob contracts), and the ECB’s policy design brought monetary shocks with much
greater inﬂuence to the Spanish unemployment rate. Interestingly, demand-side shocks on consumption,
investment and government spending had only a minor impact on the labor markets of these two countries.
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Technical Appendix
A. New-Keynesian model with unemployment, variable capital and both intensive and extensive mar-
gins for labor.
Set of log-linearized dynamic equations:
Aggregate resource constraint:
yt = cyct + iyit + zyzt + ε
g
t , (A1)
where cy =
C
Y = 1 − gy − iy, iy =
I
Y = (γ − 1 + δ)
K
Y , and zy = r
k K
Y are steady-state ratios. As in
Smets and Wouters (2007), the depreciation rate and the exogenous spending-GDP ratio are ﬁxed in the
estimation procedure at δ = 0.025 and gy = 0.18.
Consumption equation:
ct =
λ/γ
1+λ/γ ct−1+
1
1+λ/γEtct+1−
1−λ/γ
σc(1+λ/γ)


rt − r + ε
b
t

+ (σc−1)(1−u
n)1+σlNHw/c
σc(1+λ/γ)

lst −Etl
s
t+1 − (ut −Etut+1)

.
(A2)
Investment equation:
it = i1it−1 + (1− i1)Etit+1 + i2qt + ε
i
t, (A3)
where i1 =
1
1+β
, and i2 =
1
(1+β)γ2ϕ
with β = βγ(1−σc).
Arbitrage condition (value of capital, qt):
qt = q1Etqt+1 + (1− q1)Etr
k
t+1 −

Rt −Etπt+1 −


1−h/γ
σc(1+h/γ)
−1
εbt

, (A4)
where q1 = βγ
−1(1− δ) = (1−δ)
(rk+1−δ)
.
Log-linearized aggregate production function:
yt = Φy


αkst + (1− α)


hdt + n
d
t

+ εat

, (A5)
where Φy = 1 +
φ
Y = 1 +
Steady-state ﬁxed cost
Y and α is the capital-share in the production function.
20
Eﬀective capital (with one period time-to-build):
kst = kt−1 + zt. (A6)
Capital utilization:
zt = z1 log r
k
t , (A7)
where z1 =
1−ψ
ψ .
20From the zero proﬁt condition in steady-state, it should be noticed that Φy also represents the value of the steady-state
price mark-up.
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Capital accumulation equation:
kt = k1kt−1 + (1− k1)it + k2ε
i
t, (A8)
where k1 =
1−δ
γ and k2 =


1− 1−δγ
 
1 + β

γ2ϕ.
Price markup (negative of the log of the real marginal cost):
µt = α


kst −


hdt + n
d
t

+ εat − (wt − pt) . (A9)
New-Keynesian Phillips curve (price inﬂation dynamics):
πt − π =
ιp
1+βιp
(πt−1 − π) +
β
1+βιp
Et (πt+1 − π)−
(1−βξp)(1−ξp)
(1+βιp)ξpΦ
µpt + ε
p
t , (A10)
where Φ = ((Φy − 1) εp + 1)

1 + τ 2

1−
(1−βξp)ξw
1−βξpξw

. The coeﬃcient of the curvature of the Kimball
goods market aggregator is ﬁxed in the estimation procedure at εp = 10 as in Smets and Wouters (2007).
Optimal demand for capital by ﬁrms:
−


kst −


hdt + n
d
t

+ (wt − pt) = log r
k
t . (A11)
Rate of unemployment:
ut − u
n = (1− un)


nst − n
d
t

. (A12)
Wage inﬂation equation:
πwt −π
w = βEt

πwt+1 − π
w

+ιw (πt−1 − π)−βιw (πt − π)−φw


lst − l
d
t

+(1−ιw)

εwt − βEtε
w
t+1

, (A13)
where the slope coeﬃcient is φw =
(1−βξw)(1−ξw)
ξw(σ
−1
l +α)(1+Λ)
and Λ = τ1βξw(Φy−1)
σ−1l +α

1−
ξp(1−βξw)
1−βξwξp

.21
Real wage dynamics:
(wt − pt) = (wt−1 − pt−1) + (π
w
t − π
w)− (πt − π) . (A14)
Supply of total labor hours:
lst =
1
σl


(wt − pt)−
1
(1−λ/γ) (ct − (λ/γ) ct−1)

. (A15)
Labor force (extensive margin of labor supply):
nst = ε
Ns
t − ρnu (ut − u) . (A16)
Demand for hours per worker: 
2 +
ωH
1− ωH

hdt = n
d
t − (wt − pt)− ε
h
t . (A17)
21See Casares et al. (2014) for a detailed derivation of the analytical solution of the slope coeﬃcient.
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Labor supply decomposition
lst = h
s
t + n
s
t (A18)
Labor demand decomposition
ldt = h
d
t + n
d
t (A19)
Monetary policy rule:
(Rt −R) = ρ (Rt−1 −R) + (1− ρ) [rπ (πt − π) + ryyt] + r△y [yt − yt−1] + εRt . (A20)
Output gap deﬁnition:
yt = yt − ypt . (A21)
Potential (natural-rate) variables are obtained assuming ﬂexible prices, ﬂexible wages and shutting
down price markup and wage indexation shocks. They are denoted by adding a superscript “p”. The
endogenous variables of ﬂuctuations on the markup and the rate of unemployment are dropped because
they are equal to zero all the periods (µt = 0 and (ut − u
n) = 0
Flexible-price condition (no price markup ﬂuctuations, and µt = 0) replaces the price inﬂation equa-
tion:
α


ks,pt −


hd,pt + n
d,p
t

+ εat = (w
p
t − p
p
t ) (A10’)
Flexible-wage condition (no wage indexation shock ﬂuctuations, and hs,pt +n
s,p
t = h
d,p
t +n
d,p
t ) replaces
the wage inﬂation equation:
1
σl


(wt − pt)−
1
(1−λ/γ) (ct − (λ/γ) ct−1)

=

2 +
ωH
1− ωH
−1 

ndt − (wt − pt)− ε
h
t

+ nd,pt . (A13’)
Equations-and-variables summary
- Set of equations:
Eqs. (A1)-(A21) and the corresponding 18 additional equations of the potential (natural-rate) block
of the model (the output gap deﬁnition has no correspondence and deﬁnitions of µt = 0 and (ut − u
n)
are taken away) bring a total 39 semi-loglinearized dynamic equations.
- List of endogenous and exogenous variables:
Endogenous variables (39): yt, ct, it, zt, ldt , h
d
t , n
d
t , l
s
t , h
s
t , n
s
t , (Rt −R), (πt − π), (π
w
t − π
w), qt,
log rkt , k
s
t , kt, (ut − u
n), µt, (wt − pt), yt, ypt , cpt , ipt , zpt , ld,pt , hd,pt , nd,pt , ls,pt , hs,pt , ns,pt , (Rpt −R), (πpt − π),
(πw,pt − π
w), qpt , log r
k,p
t , k
s,p
t , k
p
t , and (w
p
t − p
p
t ).
Exogenous variables (9): AR(1) technology shock εat = ρaε
a
t−1 + η
a
t , AR(1) risk premium shock
εbt = ρbε
b
t−1 + η
b
t , AR(1) exogenous spending shock cross-correlated to technology innovations ε
g
t =
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ρgε
g
t−1 + η
g
t + ρgaη
a
t , AR(1) investment shock ε
i
t = ρiε
i
t−1 + η
i
t, AR(1) monetary policy shock ε
R
t =
ρRε
R
t−1 + η
R
t , ARMA(1,1) price markup shock ε
p
t = ρpε
p
t−1 + η
p
t − µpη
p
t−1, ARMA(1,1) wage push shock
εwt = ρwε
w
t−1+ η
w
t −µwη
w
t−1, AR(1) hours adjustment cost shock ε
h
t = ρhε
h
t−1+ η
h
t , and AR(1) labor force
shock εN
s
t = ρNsε
Ns
t−1 + η
Ns
t .
B. Derivation of the wage inﬂation equation
Wage setting is governed by the intertemporal labor-clearing condition
E
ξw
t
∞
j=0
β
j
ξjw


lst+j(i)− l
d
t+j(i)

= 0, (B1)
where lst+j(i) and l
d
t+j(i) are respectively the log deviations, in any t + j period, from their respective
steady-state levels of the labor supply of workers and the labor demand for jobs of type−i. The labor
supply and labor demand behavior were already respectively introduced through Eqs. (5) and (19), which
can be generalized for t+ j periods and inserted in (9) to obtain
lst+j(i)− l
d
t+j(i) =
1
σl
(wt+j(i)−wt+j) + θΦ
−1
y (pt+j(i)− pt+j) + α (wt+j(i)−wt+j) + l
s
t+j − l
d
t+j,
which can be simpliﬁed as follows
lst+j(i)− l
d
t+j(i) =

σ−1l + α

(wt+j(i)−wt+j) + θΦ
−1
y (pt+j(i)− pt+j) +

lst+j − lt+j

. (B2)
Substituting (B2) in (B1) yields
E
ξw
t
∞
j=0
β
j
ξjw

σ−1l + α

(wt+j(i)−wt+j) + θΦ
−1
y (pt+j(i)− pt+j) +

lst+j − lt+j

= 0.
Using a log-linear approximation to the wage indexation rule (Eq. 21 in the main text of the paper), and
recalling that the i ﬁrm can set the labor-clearing wage in period t, the conditional expectation of future
relative wages that cannot be revised in such way becomes
E
ξw
t (wt+j(i)−wt+j) = (wt(i)−wt) +Et
j
k=1

ιw (πt+k−1 − π) + (1− ιw) ε
w
t+k −

πwt+k − π
w

, (B3)
where πwt+j = logWt+j − logWt+j−1 is wage inﬂation in period t+ j. The relative wage consistent with
(B2) and (B3) is
wt(i)−wt = −
(1−βξw)
α+σ−1l
E
ξw
t
∞
j=0
β
j
ξjw

θΦ−1y (pt+j(i)− pt+j) +

lst+j − lt+j

−Et
∞
j=1
β
j
ξjw

ιw (πt+j−1 − π) + (1− ιw) ε
w
t+k −

πwt+j − π
w

, (B4)
which implies that the relative wage depends negatively on the stream of the economy-wide rate of
unemployment and also negatively on the stream of relative prices. As in Casares (2010), let us introduce
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the following guess: relative optimal pricing and relative wage setting are related to each other in a
loglinear fashion in accordance with
(pt(i)− pt) = (p
∗
t − pt) + τ1 (wt−1(i)−wt−1) , (B5a)
(wt(i)−wt) = (w
∗
t −wt)− τ2 (pt(i)− pt) , (B5b)
where p∗t is the log of the average optimal price, w
∗
t is the log of the average optimal wage, and τ1 and
τ2 are coeﬃcients to be determined by equilibrium conditions. We want to express the expected stream
of relative prices, E
ξw
t
∞
j=0 β
j
ξjw (pt+j(i)− pt+j), as a function of the current relative prices in order to
have a log-linear relation of the type (B5b). Replicating the algebra shown in the technical appendix of
Casares et al. (2014), the expected sum of discounted relative prices is
E
ξw
t
∞
j=0
β
j
ξjw (pt+j(i)− pt+j) =
1
1−βξwξp
(pt(i)− pt)
+τ1

βξw
1−βξw
−
βξwξp
1−βξwξp

(wt(i)−wt)−Et
∞
j=1
β
j
ξjw

πwt+j − π

− ιw (πt+j−1 − π)− (1− ιw)Etε
w
t+j
	
.
(B6)
Substituting (B6) in the relative wage Eq. (B4), we obtain:
(1 + Λ) (wt(i)−wt) = −
θΦ−1y (1−βξw)
(α+σ−1l )(1−βξwξp)
(pt(i)− pt)−
(1−βξw)
(α+σ−1l )
Et
∞
j=0
β
j
ξjw


lst+j − l
d
t+j

(B7)
+(1 + Λ)Et
∞
j=1
β
j
ξjw

πwt+j − π
w

− ιw (πt+j−1 − π)− (1− ιw) ε
w
t+j

,
with Λ =
τ1βξwθΦ
−1
y
α+σ−1l

1−
ξp(1−βξw)
1−βξwξp

.22 Eq. (B7) proves right the linear conjecture (B5b), with the
following analytical solution for τ2
τ2 =
θΦ−1y (1−βξw)
(α+σ−1l )(1−βξwξp)(1+Λ)
,
and the following expression for the average labor-clearing wage set in period t
w∗t = wt−
(1−βξw)
(σ−1l +α)(1+Λ)
Et
∞
j=0
β
j
ξjw


lst+j − l
d
t+j

+Et
∞
j=1
β
j
ξjw

πwt+j − π
w

− ιw (πt+j−1 − π)− (1− ιw) ε
w
t+j

.
(B8)
22The value of Λ depends on the coeﬃcient τ1, which measures the elasticity of relative prices to lagged relative wages As
derived in the technical appendix of Casares et al. (2014), the analytical solution for τ1 is
τ1 =
A(1−α)(1−βξp)ξw
(1−βξpξw)

1+τ2A(1−α)

1−
(1−βξp)ξw
1−βξpξw
 .
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Meanwhile, the wage indexation rule (Eq. 23 in the main text) implies a proportional relationship between
the relative wages w∗t −wt and the rate of wage inﬂation, π
w
t , adjusted by the indexation factors
w∗t −wt =
ξw
1−ξw
((πwt − π
w)− ιw (πt−1 − π)− (1− ιw) ε
w
t ) . (B9)
Combining (B8) and (B9) results in the wage inﬂation equation
πwt − π
w = βEt

πwt+1 − π
w

+ ιw (πt−1 − π)− βιw (πt − π)− φw


lst − l
d
t

+ (1− ιw)

εwt − βEtε
w
t+1

,
where the slope coeﬃcient φw =
(1−βξw)(1−ξw)
ξw(σ
−1
l +α)(1+Λ)
is analytically determined by the deep parameters of the
model.
C. Full tables with estimation results and additional impulse response functions
Table A.1.1. Priors and estimated posteriors of the structural parameters (Sample: 1996:2-2013:4)
Priors Posteriors
Germany Spain
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
ϕ: cost of adjusting cap ita l Normal 4.00 1.50 4.80 2.81 6.80 6.77 5.09 8.45
h: hab it formation Beta 0.70 0.10 0.70 0.54 0.87 0.48 0.35 0.60
σc : risk aversion Normal 1.50 0.37 0.92 0.87 0.98 1.32 0.91 1.71
σl : inverse Frisch e lastic ity Normal 2.00 0.75 0.56 0.14 0.97 2.29 1.25 3.29
ωh: hours adjustm ent Beta 0.50 0.10 0.24 0.10 0.37 0.39 0.21 0.59
ξp : p rice Calvo probability Beta 0.50 0.10 0.84 0.78 0.91 0.81 0.75 0.87
ξw : wage Calvo probab ility Beta 0.50 0.10 0.61 0.47 0.76 0.93 0.91 0.95
ιw : p rice indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.56 0.25 0.10 0.39
ιp : wage indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.32 0.12 0.53 0.53 0.22 0.84
ψ: capital utilizat.. ad just. cost Beta 0.50 0.15 0.56 0.35 0.77 0.79 0.65 0.93
rπ : inﬂation (policy ru le) Normal 1.50 0.25 1.43 1.26 1.60 1.50 1.42 1.58
ρ: inertia (policy ru le) Beta 0.75 0.10 0.90 0.87 0.93 0.91 0.87 0.95
ry : output gap (p olicy ru le) Normal 0.12 0.05 0.23 0.16 0.30 0.09 0.01 0.16
r∆y : output grow th (po licy rule) Normal 0.12 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.04 0.11
π: steady-state inﬂation Gamma 0.24 / 0.60 0.10 0.24 0.13 0.33 0.62 0.47 0.77
100(β−1−1): d iscount rate Gamma 0.25 0.10 0.19 0.08 0.29 0.22 0.08 0.34
α: capital share Normal 0.30 0.05 0.27 0.23 0.32 0.20 0.15 0.24
u: steady-state unemploym ent rate Normal 8 .0 / 15 .0 2.00 7.74 6.11 9.40 15.13 12.40 18.01
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Table A.1.2. Priors and estimated posteriors of the shock processes (Sample: 1996:2-2013:4)
Priors Posteriors
Germany Spain
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
σa : Std of productiv ity innovation Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.72 0.62 0.82 0.77 0.65 0.89
σb: S td o f risk prem ium innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.21 0.13 0.28 0.20 0.10 0.31
σg : S td of sp ending innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 3.51 3.00 3.99 2.60 2.23 2.97
σi: S td o f investm ent innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.91 0.69 1.14 0.40 0.27 0.54
σR : Std of m onetary innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.16
σp : Std of price index. innov. Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.28 0.24 0.33 0.22 0.18 0.26
σw : S td of wage index. innov. Invgamma 0.10 0.10 2.74 1.24 4.49 0.68 0.44 0.94
σh: Std of adjust. labor cost innov. Invgamma 0.10 0.10 1.54 1.29 1.80 2.89 2.27 3.50
σn: S td of labor force innov. Invgamma 0.10 0.10 0.69 0.49 0.88 0.47 0.39 0.56
ρa : Persistence of prod. sho ck Beta 0.50 0.20 0.95 0.91 0.99 0.92 0.88 0.96
ρb: Persistence o f risk prem . sho ck Beta 0.50 0.20 0.88 0.82 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.99
ρg : Persistence o f sp end ing shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.95 0.91 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.998
ρi: Persistence o f investm ent shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.32 0.13 0.51 0.56 0.34 0.77
ρR : Persistence of m onetary shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.43 0.32 0.55 0.51 0.36 0.65
ρp : Pers istence o f price sho ck Beta 0.50 0.20 0.51 0.17 0.81 0.54 0.19 0.87
ρw : Persistence o f wage shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.47 0.17 0.79 0.72 0.55 0.92
ρh: Pers istence of ad just. labor cost sho ck Beta 0.50 0.20 0.99 0.98 0.998 0.96 0.94 0.99
ρn: Persistence of labor shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.97 0.94 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.999
ρns,u: cross corr n
s, u Normal 0.50 2.00 2.24 1.36 3.09 0.27 0.11 0.43
µp: m oving-average o f price sho ck Beta 0.50 0.20 0.83 0.74 0.92 0.50 0.24 0.76
µw : m oving-average o f wage shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.53 0.27 0.80 0.33 0.11 0.54
ρga : correlation o f prod . & sp end shocks Beta 0.50 0.20 0.63 0.36 0.93 0.50 0.18 0.81
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Figure 12: IRFs after a risk-premium shock (one estimated std deviation).
Figure 13: IRFs after a ﬁscal shock (one estimated std deviation).
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Figure 14: IRFs after a ﬁscal shock (one estimated std deviation).
Figure 15: IRFs after an investment shock (one estimated std deviation).
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Figure 16: IRFs after a price-push shock (one estimated std deviation).
Figure 17: IRFs after a wage-push shock (one estimated std deviation).
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